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Research Project

Panchayati Raj in the Indian Ocean: Towards a Maritime Security Regime

Responsibility: Prof. Subrata Mitra, Peter Lehr M. A., Hendrick Lehmann M. A., Maike Tuchner

Funding Agency: Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Cologne/Germany

Introduction

The research project Panchayati Raj in the Indian Ocean – Towards a Maritime Security Regime, which is funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Cologne, seeks to draft a blueprint of a maritime system of collective security in the Indian Ocean. The feasibility of establishing such a system and its possible shape will be the two focal points of the research.
With approximately 74 million square kilometers and roughly 20 per cent of the global ocean, the Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean after the Pacific and the Atlantic. Two key characteristics distinguishes the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic and the Pacific: First, only one fifth of the total trade is conducted among the countries of the Indian Ocean themselves, 80 per cent of the trade is extra-regional (for example, crude oil to Europe, the USA and Japan). In the Atlantic and the Pacific, the proportion is exactly vice versa. Second, contrary to the Atlantic and the Pacific as "open" oceans, the Indian Ocean can only be accessed through several choke points: From the West via Cape of Good Hope, from the North via the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, from the East via the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda and Lombok-Straits and the Ombai-Wetar-Straits.
The modern history of the Indian Ocean is a history of perennial regional conflicts - in the Persian Gulf, in South Asia (the Indo-Pakistani wars), in Southeast Asia (e. g., the so-called Konfrontasi between Indonesia on the one side and Malaysia and Singapore on the other, and, nowadays, the conflicts in East-Timor, Kalimantan, the Moluccas and Aceh and the possible disintegration of Indonesia itself) and in Southern Africa. Because of the possibility of an interruption of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs), these conflict always have an international dimension as well.
Therefore, from a political science point of view, it is quite surprising that up to now, no collective security regime has been created in the Indian Ocean that could have been able to ameliorate such conflicts on a maritime level. Even the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), established in 1997, does not include a military security dimension.
We are of the opinion that a maritime collective security regime, based on mutual trust and cooperation, would be a) sensible and b) feasible. Signals from Indian Ocean Rim states pointing in this direction are already discernible.
Our research project can be summarized as follows: In a first step, we take up already existing ideas from the region itself to test them in terms of their feasibility. The results of the feasibility study are used for the draft of a catalogue of confidence and security building measures. In a second step, we introduce this catalogue to political scientists, politicians and other relevant persons from important Indian Ocean Rim states for discussion on workshops or meetings. The input of these persons forms the basis for a blueprint of a maritime collective security regime suitable for the problems in the Indian Ocean region at large which we will draft in a third step. The blueprint will finally be introduced on workshops and conferences. However, this policy counseling dimension will not form a focal point in our research project. The focus lies on a theoretically and empirically sound analysis of the feasibility and possible shape of a maritime collective security regime in the Indian Ocean. Implementation itself is a political question and as such beyond our means.

Naval Symposium

A naval symposium or conference, being held annually or biannually, would form the lowest possible level for a security regime. It would have the advantage of a low grade of institutionalization and a low grade of officiality and obligation which would help to reduce both political and financial costs for potential members. The conference would not be a political forum, but rather a "get-together of friendly navies" of the Indian Ocean littoral countries. Both Milan in the Bay of Bengal – which was not known to us when we designed the project – and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) could provide useful models for an Indian Ocean Rim Naval Symposium (IORNS). WPNS could be useful because it succeeded so far to "create an environment that [assists] in building confidence and enhancing cooperation through, inter alia: personal contacts, transparency, exchange of fleet programmes, observation and prior notification of fleet exercises, information sharing, port visits… and exchange of information on naval procurement and retirement programmes…" Milan could be useful because it shows that a regionally focused regime can be extended gradually to eventually cover the whole region. This argument will be developed more fully below.

A Second Track Organization as a Middle-Level Approach

A second model which is worth to be discussed in the context of the Indian Ocean is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). CSCAP intends to bring together participating countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific by way of multisectoral member committees composed of academics, business persons, journalists, ex-politicians, elder statesmen and government officials (who participate in their private capacities only). A comparable Council for Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean (CSCIO) would thus basically be a semi-official forum with a low grade of institutionalization and obligation, but with a more comprehensive agenda than a naval conference. As such, it would be more ambitious, but the problem we encountered with the "naval" aspect of the suggested conference (elaborated below) could be overcome.

A Regional Forum

An Indian Ocean Rim Regional Forum (IORRF), patterned after the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), would be the most ambitious approach with at least a chance of implementation. Just like ARF, a forum in the Indian Ocean would still have a minimalized institutional structure, but a high grade of officiality and obligation. Such a forum would provide an opportunity for government officials at a high level to discuss political and security issues of concern and to develop cooperative measures which might be taken to contribute to peace and stability in the region. The forum would have a formal agenda, structured meetings and legalistic procedures. The consensus method would be used and decisions would be implemented as "soft law" (informal agreements).
In our opinion, an annual maritime conference patterned according to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) could be the most appropriate way to get a maritime security regime under way, since it is a very low key venture without any real institutionalization. More ambitious ventures like a regional forum – or a "Helsinki process" – might be premature for the Indian Ocean.

Expert Interviews

In addition to the collection of quantitative and qualitative data, we also conduct expert interviews (i.e., specialists in the fields of security studies and international relations, naval officers and, if possible, government officials) in South Africa, South Asia (with a focus on India and Pakistan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) and Australia. The aims of these expert interviews are first, to sound out the feasibility of a maritime security regime in the Indian Ocean and second, to work out possible items to be included in such a regime. The results of the interviews are used to sketch out a first draft for a model of an Indian Ocean-wide maritime security regime.
Until the end of December 2000, members of the work group traveled to Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Prof. Cheema) and to India, Nepal and the United Arab Emirates (Peter Lehr/Maike Tuchner). In March/April 2001, interviews will be conducted in Australia and Singapore (Peter Lehr and Hendrick Lehmann). A trip to South Africa is currently under preparation.
Prof. Cheema conducted expert interviews in the following institutions:

Singapore: National University; Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Malaysia: Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA); Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), both at Kuala Lumpur
Sri Lanka: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo
Pakistan: Foundation for Research on International Environment, National Development and Security (FRIENDS), Rawalpindi; Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Islamabad

Peter Lehr and Maike Tuchner conducted expert interviews at the following institutions:

India/New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group (DPG); Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA), Political Science Department, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU); Society for Indian Ocean Studies (SIOS); United Services Institute (USI)
India/Chennai (Madras): Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Madras University; Political Science Department, Madras Christian College
Nepal: National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS), Kathmandu; Department of Political Science, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu; South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Jalipur
Additionally, Peter Lehr and Maike Tuchner met with the French Naval Attaché, Commander Jean Arnaud at the French Embassy in New Delhi, and with naval officers of United Arab Emirates navies in Dubai.

Further, the following public talks and panel discussions took place during the field trips:

Panel Discussions:

Prof. Cheema: Panel Discussion in Singapore
Peter Lehr/Maike Tuchner: Two Panel Discussions a) at the Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi and b) at the United Services Institute, New Delhi

Public Talks:

Peter Lehr: "A Security Community in the Indian Ocean?", held on Sept. 07, 2000 at the International Conference Centre, New Delhi
Maike Tuchner: "Feasible Models for Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean", held on Sept. 07, 2000 at the International Conference Centre, New Delhi

Preliminary Analysis of the Interviews

a) About the Questionnaire

Common Cooperative Security Theory. This theoretical part focuses on the applicability and usability of our Western terms of reference in the Indian Ocean Region as a non-Western setting.
Current Security Environment in the Indian Ocean and the Role of Navies. This set of questions deals with the current security environment in general and the role of navies and naval power in the Indian Ocean in the perception of our respondents.
Defining the Indian Ocean as a Foreign Policy Arena. In this part, our intentions is to find out whether, in the opinion of the respondents, the Indian Ocean forms a region of its own in more than a geographical sense and if yes, whether this is mirrored in the foreign policy of the respondent's home country. A second set of questions is asked to see whether there is a perceived necessity of an Indian-Ocean-wide regime.
Regime Structure. This part deals with the question of how a regime should look like, if the respondent has answered positively before. While the first set of questions in this part deals with the structure itself, a second set of questions (in form of a table) covers ossible contents for such a regime. Possible models and contents are taken from our odels explained above and from the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC).

b) The Indian Range of Opinions

In regard of the first, theoretical part of the questionnaire, only two Indian interview partners responded. Both of them are of the opinion that Western politological terms can be applied in a Non-Western setting. However, they also pointed out that many of those terms, like Confidence Building Measures are coming with a certain 'Cold War baggage' in the sense that they may contain some negative connotations one should be aware of.

All respondents perceived the current security environment in the Indian Ocean as stable and overall positive. It was described as basically a low threat environment. Compared with the superpower conflict in the seventies and eighties, the security situation has improved considerably since the beginning of the nineties. Also, there was a consensus among the respondents that those major sea powers which are capable of disrupting the SLOCs are agreed that the Indian Ocean should remain peaceful. So, in the opinion of all Indian respondents, today, there is no power competition visible in this area. Somewhat surprisingly, both the USN and the PLAN were not seen as threatening by Indian naval officers, too. Those respondents even denied the presence of 'blue water navies' capable for power projection other than the USN.

On the other hand, non-state actors were pointed out as a possible threat to stability in the Indian Ocean. Frequently suggested were piracy (mainly in Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea and the coastal waters of Somalia), mercenary actions or drug trafficking, gun running and illegal migration.

The respondents also agreed that the Indian Navy creates some unease, especially so by Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The reason for this is, in the opinion of the respondents, a capability mismatch between the Indian Navy and other IOR navies. For this reason, a process of confidence building had been encouraged by the Indian Navy, like invitations for port visits or invitation of delegates from countries with only a small navy or no navy at all. MILAN in the Bay of Bengal (now MILAN East) was mentioned as a successful example of such confidence building measures. In 1999, MILAN was introduced to the Arabian Sea as MILAN West, where naval cooperation already exists between the Indian Navy and the navies of Iraq, Iran, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Concerning the Indian Ocean as a foreign policy area, the Indian respondents opined that up to now, India had not actually developed an Indian Ocean policy, not even an Indian Ocean economic policy. Despite some efforts of some institutions, the respondents doubt that there were a maritime notion as such in India. The maritime history of India is thought to be missing, and the same is said to be true for an Indian Ocean awareness. India is part of the Indian Ocean region, but that is not very important for its foreign policy, especially so since all conflicts with neighboring states are situated at India's land borders. In the perception of the respondents, an Indian Ocean awareness began to develop because of the importance of SLOCs and the EEZ only very recently.

The idea of establishing a maritime security regime in the Indian Ocean was received with great skepticism. All in all, the respondents did not see the discussion of security affairs in the Indian Ocean in the near future since the situation and the security environment was not ripe. However, it was frequently pointed out that a larger dialogue relationship was building between IOR states. Therefore, the idea of a maritime conference – albeit dealing with strictly non-sensitive, e. g. non-military, matters – was being perceived as a possible way to establish such a dialogue on a regular basis. Again, MILAN in the Bay of Bengal was mentioned as a genuine Indian initiative in this respect. But even an emulation of the Asia-Pacific Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was deemed to be feasible in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the use of the term "naval" was strongly criticized, since this term implies the coverage of sensitive issues which would make the conference idea a non-starter. Instead, the term "maritime" was recommended as a more inclusive and comprehensive term.

It was also pointed out to us that many initiatives would founder simply for the smaller states' lack of money to send delegates for such a purpose. This problem had to be taken under consideration when a maritime conference were to be implemented.

c) The Range of Non-Indian Opinions

In regard of our definitions, there was hardly any disagreement among the political scientists interviewed.

Some dissatisfaction were expressed by many respondents over the existing security environment in the Indian Ocean. The build-up of blue water navies was viewed with skepticism and a certain amount of suspicion. By the Pakistanis, it was seen as an Indian attempt to project their power in congruence with old Indian ambitions to control the Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. Some Sri Lankan opined that the Indian attempts to build up a credible sea power indicates that India regarded itself as the heir to the British and tended to behave like them. However, almost everybody recognized India as an important actor in the Indian Ocean.

Most interviewees felt that the existing Laws of the Sea Convention (LOSC) needs to be improved. They do not adequately address the concerns of the smaller nations as well as those of the hinterland states. In their opinion, the LOSC could provide the much desired umbrella to the smaller regional states. Since the land resources are depleting rather rapidly, it was viewed all the more essential to device a method that can adequately protect the share of the nations in the resources of the Indian Ocean. Many smaller nations lack the ability to assert their legitimate concerns which, they felt, could be safeguarded by the LOSC.

Concerning the role of navies in the Indian Ocean, it was generally acknowledged that navies could be useful instruments of foreign policy, it was specifically stressed by almost everyone that the role of a navy depends upon a country's location. Both the Singaporeans and the Sri Lankans stressed the limited nature of their navy's role. Ordinarily, the island nations tend to devote more attention and resources to Ocean affairs and tend to build a relatively strong navy but the Sri Lankan Navy has proven to be an exception to the generally prevalent rule. The explanation given by most Sri Lankan interviewees was that there is no maritime tradition in Sri Lanka. Besides, the respective governments were never able to allocate adequate resources for building a strong navy despite the fact that developments in the Indian Ocean have direct impact on the destiny of Sri Lanka. It was only after the beginning of the LTTE uprising that Sri Lanka began to allocate some resources to its navy, too. The Singaporeans felt that their navy's role is mainly confined to patrolling and supplementing its coast guard's activities. However, Singapore and Indonesia conduct joint naval exercises (primarily anti-submarine exercises). The Singaporean respondents also stressed that India is taken more seriously than was the case in the past after the 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistani respondents saw a much bigger role for their navy. Apart from safeguarding its coast line and protecting its sea lines of communication (SLOCs), its submarine capability is aimed to deny any undue advantage the Indian Navy may try to exploit.

In respect of the Indian Ocean as a region in itself, non-Indian the respondents proved to be as skeptic as their Indian colleagues. The Indian Ocean is not a homogenous entity, instead, it consists of many sub regions with their own peculiar requirements.

Being asked about a naval (or: maritime) security regime in the Indian Ocean, all the Singaporeans, Malaysians, Sri Lankans and Pakistanis agreed that cooperation in the soft areas is more feasible than in the hard areas like military security. Yet many Sri Lankans stressed that it could be desirable to have some kind of cooperative venture even in the field of naval activities. While recognizing the difficulties involved in such a pursuit, it was highlighted that all multilateral cooperation began in a modest way and the subsequent incremental processes helped them to evolve into a very comprehensive organization.

A view was also expressed by some of the Sri Lankans and Pakistanis that cooperation may begin at a sub regional level with the expressed aims to cover the entire Indian ocean at a later stage. Among the suggested models and patterns for a future cooperative regime, the general consensus was that an annual conference appeared to be more feasible. But just like their Indian colleagues, the non-Indian respondents took issue with the term "naval" and suggested the term "maritime" instead. This Annual Maritime Conference should be an inclusive one, in which all interested Indian Ocean Rim states could participate, including the outside powers and the hinterland states. Admittedly it would be a large organization but consensus could easily be secured in the soft areas initially and later efforts could be directed to deal with issues of hard areas.

Some Trends

From the preliminary evaluation of our interviews and of the literature relevant for the subject, we are able to glean the following trends:
The Problem of "Western" Terminology
In the preparation stage of the project we realized that some of the terminology we used was understood by some of the specialists contacted in a different way than we had expected. Some terms were even rejected altogether. For example, some Southeast Asian respondents discarded the term Confidence Building Measures (CBM) for various reasons in favor of Trust Building Measures (TBM). For this reason, we decided to include a part on terminology into our questionnaire. During our travels to South Asia and Southeast Asia, we soon found out that – with one exception – all interviewees accepted our working definitions. Most interviewees simply pointed out that some of our definitions could contain some negative "Cold War baggage".
However, the application of the term Naval Security was generally criticized. All respondents suggested to drop it in favor of the more comprehensive and less problematic term Maritime Security – which we did.
Geopolitical Assessment of the Indian Ocean
Indian and Non-Indian respondents had different perceptions on the overall security situation in the Indian Ocean. In the perception of the Indian interviewees, the geopolitical and geoeconomical environment in the Indian Ocean after the end of the superpower conflict is positive and stable. Security problems are posed only by non-state actors like drug traffickers, small arms traffickers and pirates, especially in the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Straits. Illicit fishing was also pointed out as a source of conflicts, both in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. According to some respondents from the Indian Navy, there were some incidents of armed clashes between Thai trawlers and Indian patrol vessels. The trawlers involved were armed with automatic weapons and some even with bazookas.
Non-Indian respondents drew a much more negative picture of the security environment in the Indian Ocean. Nuclearization of India and Pakistan and the civil wars in Somalia and Indonesia were frequently mentioned as potential sources for conflict with Indian Ocean-wide dimensions.
The question whether the Indian Ocean can be defined as more than a mere geographical region was met with great skepticism by all respondents, Indian and Non-Indian alike. Interestingly, most respondents did agree that the Indian ocean has been a region in its own right in the eighties. The reason for this was seen in a spill-over of the superpower conflict between the USA and the USSR from the Atlantic and the Pacific into this region. This resulted in a perception of common security concerns and in initiatives like the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZOP) proposal. Now that the superpower conflict is gone, the idea of a region dissipates again. The reason behind this is, in the opinion even of the Indian respondents, a general lack of a "maritime tradition" and a general lack of knowledge about the importance of the ocean for the rim states. This could be a formidable obstacle for any kind of regime for the whole Indian Ocean.

The Idea of a Maritime Security Regime
The idea of a regular maritime conference patterned after the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) found general acceptance both with the Indian and the Non-Indian respondents. However, nearly all respondents expressed doubts that IOR-ARC could be a feasible platform for establishing such a conference. In the perception of our respondents, IOR-ARC already foundered for various reasons. A maritime conference or symposium should therefore be an independent venture.
All respondents also pointed out that it would be very difficult to convince responsible policy makers of the necessity of such a regime. Most respondents therefore agreed with our basic (neorealist) assumption that a maritime regime in the Indian Ocean can only be implemented when a dominant state – or group of states – would push the initiative forward. Interestingly, many Indian and Non-Indian respondents named the Federal Republic of Germany in this context as one extra-regional possibility.

Preliminary Lessons from our Interviews in South Asia and Southeast Asia

The interviews conducted so far showed that a maritime regime in the shape of a regular symposium comparable to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) would indeed contribute to the overall security in this region. As such, an Indian Ocean Rim Naval Symposium (IORNS) would be sensible. The feasibility of such a regime, however, especially for the whole Indian Ocean Rim, was seen very skeptical, at least for the first phase of implementation.
But the interviews with our South Asian and Southeast Asian interview partners also contained a possible solution for this problem: creating a maritime regime in one part of the Indian Ocean "where the trouble makers are not present", as one Indian respondent quipped, and slowly and gradually extending it to other parts of the region to eventually cover the whole Indian Ocean Rim. An example for this approach could be Milan East in the Bay of Bengal. This "social gathering of naval personnel" from navies present in the Bay of Bengal was initiated by India as an attempt to appease concerns in regard of its naval build-up. Because of its success as a confidence building measure, India organized a similar venture in the Arabian Sea in 1999 with the navies of the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, UAE and Oman as participants. Since the Bay of Bengal is a part of the Indian Ocean without "trouble makers" (as defined by Indians), it could be a useful focus for either beefing up Milan or implementing a more ambitious symposium.

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